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1003 
Note 
 
Legitimate Absenteeism: The Unconstitutionality 
of the Caucus Attendance Requirement 
Heather R. Abraham∗ 
As a wave of hope spread across the country during the 
2008 election season, Felipe Goodman grew cynical.1 After serv-
ing ten years as a rabbi in Nevada, the Mexico native com-
pleted the citizenship process with the intention of voting in the 
election.2 He registered to vote, only to learn that he had to 
choose between two defining American promises—the freedom 
of religion and the right to vote.3 State party officials had 
scheduled Nevada’s caucuses on a Saturday.4 Party rules stipu-
lated that he had to be physically present to vote in the party 
caucus, no exceptions.5 Therefore, as an Orthodox rabbi, Good-
man could not participate.6 
Rabbi Goodman is not alone in his disenfranchisement. He 
lives in one of fourteen states whose political parties still hold 
caucuses to endorse presidential candidates.7 The physical at-
 
∗  J.D. Candidate 2012, University of Minnesota Law School. I thank 
Professor David A. Schultz for his creative ideas and guidance in writing this 
Note. I appreciate his dedication to academic collaboration with students. 
Thanks to the many people who allowed me to interview them as I learned 
more about party caucuses. I am struck by their tireless efforts to improve the 
operation of the caucus system. In addition, a special thanks to Joe Hansen 
and Laura Arneson of the Minnesota Law Review for their constructive com-
ments and revisions and Managing Editor Charles Higgins for his attentive 
edits and improvements. Copyright © 2011 by Heather R. Abraham. 
 1. See Hilary Leila Krieger, Caucus Deals Shabbat Blow to Vegas Rabbi, 
JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 18, 2008, at 1. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id.; see also Michael Falcone, Iowa Caucuses Move to Saturday in ’10, 
POLITICO (July 29, 2009, 10:46 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0709/ 
25555.html (illustrating a possible trend toward Saturday caucuses). 
 5. See Krieger, supra note 1, at 1. 
 6. Id.  
 7. FEC, 2008 PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY DATES (2008), available at http:// 
www.fec.gov/pubrec/2008pdates.pdf. This number includes the District of Co-
lumbia, as well as states like Minnesota and Texas, which have two-step caucus-
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tendance requirement of most caucuses tends to disenfranchise 
identifiable factions of voters, such as deployed service mem-
bers, religious observers, persons with disabilities or in poor 
health, students who attend school away from home, and shift 
workers unable to leave work.8 
Dubbed by the Washington Post as “undemocratic,”9 the 
caucus system has been the focus of much-deserved criticism. 
Historically, caucuses have drastically lower voter turnout 
rates than primaries,10 attract voters from extreme ends of the 
ideological spectrum,11 involve cumbersome procedural rules,12 
and require long time commitments.13 Recent events have 
 
plus-primary systems, and states like Washington and Idaho, in which at least 
one party holds a nonbinding primary in addition to caucuses. See also 2008 
Presidential Primary Calendar, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan. 9, 2008), 
http://www.ncsl.org/LegislaturesElections/ElectionsCampaigns/Presidential 
PrimariesCalendar2008/tabid/16512/Default.aspx. Some sources refer to the 
New Mexico Democratic caucus as a primary because it is logistically similar 
and allows for absentee voting. See Teddy Davis, Hillary Clinton Wins New 
Mexico Primary, ABCNEWS.COM, Feb. 14, 2008, http://blogs.abcnews.com/ 
politicalradar/2008/02/hillary-clinton.html. 
 8. See, e.g., Scott Helman, Getting Out the College Vote—When Campuses 
Are Empty: Primary Dates in N.H., Iowa Will Clash With Breaks, BOS. GLOBE, 
Dec. 7, 2007, at A34, available at 2007 WLNR 24191117 (discussing the bar-
riers students face in returning to campus to caucus and vote in primaries 
during winter break); Jodi Kantor, Caucuses Give Iowa Influence, But Many 
Iowans Are Left Out, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2008, at A1, available at 2008 WLNR 
58001 (reporting that even the chairman of the Iowa Republican Party had to 
miss his own caucus because he had to travel out of town on party business). 
 9. Sean Wilentz & Julian E. Zelizer, A Rotten Way to Pick a President, 
WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 2008, at B3.  
 10. See, e.g., Michael McDonald, 2008 Presidential Primary Turnout 
Rates, U.S. ELECTION PROJECT (Oct. 8, 2008), http://elections.gmu.edu/Turnout_ 
2008P.html. For an example of the disparity, compare the historical numbers 
of two states with similar populations from the same geographical region, such 
as Minnesota and Wisconsin. In 2008, Wisconsin’s primary attracted 37.1 per-
cent of eligible voters, while Minnesota’s caucuses drew only 7.4 percent. Id. 
Considerably more voters participate in Wisconsin primaries, despite Minne-
sota’s traditionally high level of civic participation. See, e.g., Voter Turnout 
Since 1950, MINN. SECRETARY ST., http://www.sos.state.mn.us/index.aspx?page= 
667 (last visited Oct. 24, 2010).  
 11. See JAMES W. DAVIS, U.S. PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES AND THE CAUCUS-
CONVENTION SYSTEM 49–50 (1997) (employing Barry Goldwater’s success in 
the 1964 caucuses to illustrate how an ideological minority of party voters can 
sway caucus outcomes); William G. Mayer, Caucuses: How They Work, What 
Difference They Make, in IN PURSUIT OF THE WHITE HOUSE 105, 130 (William 
G. Mayer ed., 1996). 
 12. See Mayer, supra note 11, at 108–16. 
 13. See TOVA ANDREA WANG, THE CENTURY FOUND., HAS AMERICA 
OUTGROWN THE CAUCUS? SOME THOUGHTS ON RESHAPING THE NOMINATION 
CONTEST 3 (2007), available at http://tcf.org/media-center/2007/pr136. 
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spawned a flood of additional scorn.14 For instance, in 2008, a 
surge of new voters left caucus officials overwhelmed by the 
masses, causing cramped voters to stand for hours in over-
crowded elementary schools.15  
Despite their flaws, caucuses are treasured by many voters 
who have grown up with the tradition.16 Nonetheless, caucuses 
in their current form may unconstitutionally deny some voters 
their rights to vote. While some legal scholars have dismissed 
party endorsements as private processes that are effectively off-
limits to regulation,17 federal judicial precedent leaves the door 
open for colorable constitutional arguments against the caucus 
attendance requirement. 
This Note contends that eligible party voters18 have the 
constitutional right to vote in their parties’ caucuses without 
being physically present.19 Part I details the history of the 
American political caucus—its origin, changing form, and the 
role political parties have played in shaping its structure. Part 
 
 14. See id.; Gilbert Cranberg et al., Op-Ed., Iowa’s Undemocratic Caucus-
es, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2007, at A35, available at 2007 WLNR 24915832. 
 15. See George Diepenbrock & Sophia Maines, Overflow Crowds Jam 
Caucus Sites, LAWRENCE J.-WORLD & NEWS, Feb. 6, 2008, http://www2.ljworld 
.com/news/2008/feb/06/overflow_crowds_jam_caucus_sites/. 
 16. See Kantor, supra note 8, at A1 (explaining that many caucus-goers 
value the community engagement opportunity caucuses provide). But see 
Kathryn Pearson, Caucuses Are Voices of the Few, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, 
Minn.) (Feb. 10, 2008, 5:22 PM), http://www.startribune.com/opinion/ 
commentary/15453976.html (responding that in some caucuses, no dialogue be-
tween neighbors actually takes place). 
 17. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Whatever Happened to “One Person, One 
Vote”?, SLATE (Feb. 5, 2008, 5:33 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2183751/ (ar-
guing that parties have ultimate legal discretion over delegate selection). 
 18. One inherent difficulty in categorizing primary voters is that each 
state has different eligibility rules. For instance, to caucus in Colorado, state 
party members must be “affiliated” with the party for at least two months 
prior to the caucus. See COLO. DEMOCRATIC PARTY, PLAN OF ORGANIZATION AND 
RULES 25 (2009), available at http://www.coloradodems.org/docs/PartyRules_ 
20091205.pdf. By contrast, in states like Minnesota, eligibility is more flexible 
as voters need not prove party loyalty even though they are statutorily sup-
posed to “agree[ ]” with party principles. See MINN. STAT. § 202A.16 (2008) 
(“Only those persons who are in agreement with the principles of the party as 
stated in the party’s constitution, and who either voted or affiliated with the 
party at the last general election or intend to vote or affiliate with the party at 
the next state general election, may vote at the precinct caucus.”). 
 19. This Note focuses on presidential elections, but most of its arguments 
extend to other federal and state elections. The Constitution protects the right 
of all qualified citizens to vote in both state and federal elections. See, e.g., 
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554 (1964); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 
299, 315 (1941). 
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II examines three legal arguments that cast doubt on the con-
stitutionality of the attendance requirement. First, caucuses 
may violate the First Amendment associational rights of voters. 
Second, they may breach Fourteenth Amendment equal protec-
tion of the right to vote. Third, they may constitute an uncon-
stitutional poll tax. Part III proposes four alternatives to the 
present system to mitigate potential unconstitutionality and 
evaluates their likelihood of success against anticipated bar-
riers to reform. Additionally, it examines which actors are best 
situated to reform caucuses. This Note concludes that the two 
most effective avenues to reform the caucus system to reduce 
the risk of unconstitutionality are an associational rights judi-
cial challenge and congressional legislation. In light of the re-
cent establishment of reform commissions within the two major 
national parties to address delegate selection and an upcoming 
presidential election with a wide-open Republican field, a fail-
ure to reform caucuses could have substantial adverse implica-
tions. 
I.  THE ORIGINS AND CHANGING FORM OF POLITICAL 
CAUCUSES   
The process of selecting presidential nominees has evolved 
considerably in the past two centuries from a system in which 
congressmen chose their parties’ nominees to today’s state-by-
state primary and caucus scheme.20 Primaries and caucuses in 
their modern forms are reactions to the party-controlled “Boss 
Tweed” and “King Caucus” era of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.21 In the 1910s and shortly thereafter, the 
voting public came to regard the caucus system as an instru-
ment of party leader control; this perception stimulated a shift 
in many states from caucuses to primaries.22 Today, most 
states either hold state-operated primaries or outsource the 
process to political parties in the form of caucuses.23 This Part 
 
 20. See DAVIS, supra note 11, at 9–18. 
 21. Id. at 11–12. 
 22. Id.  
 23. See, e.g., Robert McDowell, It’s Time to Return to the Caucus System, 
TULSA BEACON, Apr. 30, 2009, http://www.tulsabeacon.com/?p=1940. Despite 
the overall trend toward primaries, in recent years some states have consid-
ered returning to caucuses to save desperately needed revenue. See id. (advo-
cating a shift from primaries to caucuses to conserve tax dollars). Some states 
have gone so far as to debate eliminating the primary system altogether. Cf. 
Presidential Primaries, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (May 12, 2005), http:// 
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examines the origin and changing nature of the party caucus 
within the American political landscape. 
A. POLITICAL CAUCUSES AND PRIMARIES DEFINED 
The term “caucus” has several meanings in American no-
menclature. Early accounts refer to it as an informal nickname 
for party meetings for selecting candidates for political office.24 
Today, in addition to referring to meetings for selecting candi-
dates, it also refers to an organized group of people who share 
common interests, such as a caucus within a legislature.25 The 
caucus attendance requirement, as used in this Note, refers to 
any state party rule requiring physical attendance in order to 
vote for a presidential nominee in a precinct caucus.  
In contrast, a “primary election” is a preliminary election, 
not requiring physical attendance, in which voters nominate a 
candidate for the general election.26 The most significant differ-
ence between caucuses and primaries is administration. Parties 
usually operate and pay for caucuses while state governments 
fund and administer primaries.27 An “open” primary allows 
voters to choose the party from which they wish to endorse a 
candidate, no matter their political affiliation.28 Most states 
have “closed” primaries, which require voters to indicate a par-
ty preference and limit their choice of candidates to one party.29 
A “blanket” primary requires no party affiliation and does not 
restrict a voter’s choice of candidates to a single party.30  
 
www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=16568 (listing state bills introduced to elimi-
nate presidential primaries). 
 24. JOHN PICKERING, A VOCABULARY 55 (1816). The word “cant” illu-
strates the slang-like, informal nature of caucuses. Id. 
 25. JACK C. PLANO & MILTON GREENBERG, AMERICAN POLITICAL 
DICTIONARY 95, 130 (rev. ed. 1967). 
 26. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 557 (8th ed. 2004). This Note also employs 
“primary” as a general term for the primary season, which encompasses both 
primaries and caucuses. 
 27. See, e.g., McDowell, supra note 23. 
 28. NEW DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN POLITICS 302–03 (Edward Conrad 
Smith & Arnold John Zurcher eds., 1949); DAVID ROBERTSON, A DICTIONARY 
OF MODERN POLITICS 274–75 (1985). 
 29. NEW DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN POLITICS, supra note 28, at 302–03. 
 30. THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF POLITICS, at x (Iain McLean & 
Alistair McMillan eds., 2009) (“[V]oters are free to move back and forth across 
a blanket-sized ballot that includes all candidates from all parties.”). 
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B. COURT- AND PARTY-INITIATED CAUCUS REFORM  
Political theorists and party leaders have argued that nom-
inations are more important than general elections because 
“the quality of the people’s verdict [in the general election] de-
pends on the quality of the options from which they cho[o]se.”31 
It is no surprise, then, that traditionally excluded caucus and 
primary voters have challenged party attempts to prevent their 
participation. This section highlights legal and political devel-
opments that frame the constitutional issues surrounding pri-
mary elections, in general, and the caucus attendance require-
ment, in particular. 
In a series of cases spanning the 1920s–1930s, courts 
pierced the private structure of political parties by invalidating 
white-only primaries. In 1927, the U.S. Supreme Court unan-
imously overturned a Texas white-only primary statute as a vi-
olation of the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection 
Clause.32 The Texas Democratic Party’s State Executive Com-
mittee then passed a new resolution limiting eligibility in its 
primary to white voters.33 Finding that the Executive Commit-
tee was acting not as a mere private organization but “in mat-
ters of high public interest, matters intimately connected with 
the capacity of government to exercise its functions,” the Court 
held 5-4 that the Committee’s actions violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.34 Twelve years later in Smith v. Allwright, the 
Court crafted a stronger rule that white-only primaries also vi-
olated the Fifteenth Amendment.35 These cases36 provide a ba-
sis for judicial intervention into party activities when a party 
 
 31. Alexandra L. Cooper, Nominating Presidential Candidates: The Pri-
mary Season Compared to Two Alternatives, 54 POL. RES. Q. 771, 774 (2001) 
(quoting WILLIAM R. KEECH & DONALD R. MATTHEWS, THE PARTY’S CHOICE 1 
(1976)); see also DAVIS, supra note 11, at 1 (quoting infamous party boss Wil-
liam Marcy Tweed as saying, “I don’t care who does the electing just so I can 
do the nominating.”). 
 32. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540–41 (1927). 
 33. Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 82 (1932). 
 34. Id. at 88–89. 
 35. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664 (1944) (“When primaries become 
a part of the machinery for choosing officials, state and national[,] . . . the 
same tests to determine the character of discrimination or abridgement should 
be applied to the primary as are applied to the general election.”). 
 36. Collectively, this universe of cases is commonly referred to as the 
“white primary cases.” See, e.g., Michael J. Pitts, Redistricting and Discrimi-
natory Purpose, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1575, 1616 (2010).  
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violates the Constitution while performing a state-like function, 
such as administering elections.37 
In 1968, the nation watched in shock as violence erupted at 
the Democratic National Convention in Chicago.38 In response 
to the “bitter disharmony”39 of 1968, the Democratic Party in-
itiated what became known as the McGovern-Fraser Commis-
sion.40 The Commission established guidelines for the delegate-
selection process that weakened the degree of party leader con-
trol.41 The National Republican Party largely mirrored the 
Democratic reforms suggested by the Commission.42 In re-
sponse to public calls for reform, many state legislatures also 
replaced their caucuses with primaries even though the nation-
al parties had not mandated it.43  
While party attempts to reform delegate selection have not 
subsided, recent changes have been more incremental.44 One 
noteworthy change is party efforts to expand the caucus-going 
population. For instance, in 2004 and 2008, the Maine State 
Democratic Party responded to historically low caucus turnout 
by operating a robust absentee voting program.45 Further, or-
 
 37. Allwright, 321 U.S. at 664. 
 38. Cooper, supra note 31, at 772. 
 39. Judith A. Center, 1972 Democratic Convention Reforms and Party 
Democracy, 89 POL. SCI. Q. 325, 326 (1974). 
 40. Cooper, supra note 31, at 772. 
 41. THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATIONS IN A REFORM AGE 
36 (1981). The guidelines focused on three recurring themes: more rank-and-
file party members should be encouraged to participate; the convention should 
be more representative of historically underrepresented groups like racial mi-
norities, women, and young voters; and the allocation of delegates should bet-
ter reflect the wishes of ordinary party voters, not just party regulars. Id. 
 42. See id. at 40. 
 43. Id. at 47. In 1968, sixteen Republican state parties and seventeen 
Democratic state parties held primaries. Id. By 1980, thirty-six Republican 
and thirty-four Democratic state parties had shifted to primaries. Id. 
 44. See THOMAS GANGALE, FROM THE PRIMARIES TO THE POLLS: HOW TO 
REPAIR AMERICA’S BROKEN PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION PROCESS 21 (2008) 
(finding that after McGovern-Fraser, parties “tinker[ed] around the edges” 
with efforts like the Mikulski and Winograd Commissions).  
 45. See Arden Manning, Letter to the Editor, Democrats’ Caucus Will Play 
Large Role in Election, MORNING SENTINEL (Maine), Feb. 9, 2008, http:// 
morningsentinel.mainetoday.com/view/letters/4737404.html; Telephone Inter-
view with Arden Manning, State Exec. Dir., Me. Democratic Party (Nov. 12, 
2009) [hereinafter Manning Interview]. In Douglas County, Nebraska, the local 
Democratic Party created its own absentee process to expand caucus voting to 
deployed troops, people in nursing homes, the homebound, the disabled, stu-
dents, and employees who could not miss work. See Telephone Interview with 
Carol Casey, Exec. Dir., Douglas Cnty. Democrats (Oct. 19, 2009). 
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ganizers within both major national parties have compelled 
their national committees to establish commissions to study 
caucus-related voting reform.46 Despite these efforts, most cau-
cus state parties maintain stringent physical attendance re-
quirements.47 
C. LEGAL PRECEDENT FOR CHALLENGING THE ATTENDANCE 
REQUIREMENT 
Federal election law offers several methods for challenging 
the caucus system. This section provides the background for 
three colorable constitutional challenges: associational rights, 
equal protection, and poll taxes. 
1. The Right to Political Association 
It is settled law that individuals have the right to political-
ly associate under the First48 and Fourteenth49 Amendments, 
which, among other things, allows them “to band together in 
promoting . . . the electorate candidates who espouse their po-
litical views.”50 Regulations that “severe[ly] burden” associa-
tional rights must be tailored to serve a compelling state inter-
est.51 
 
 46. See Telephone Interview with Roman Buhler, Former Staff Member, 
Republican Nat’l Convention (RNC) (Oct. 28, 2009) [hereinafter Buhler Inter-
view]. In anticipation of the RNC, organizers from John McCain’s campaign 
for president drafted a resolution requiring the party to provide an absentee 
voting option in caucuses for military personnel. Id. Two military veterans in-
troduced this strongly worded proposed rule to the RNC Rules Committee, but 
the final version passed by the RNC was amended to encourage state parties 
to use “every means practicable” to encourage military participation in the 
delegate selection process. Id.; see also REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMM., THE RULES 
OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, Rule 15(c)(7), at 20 (2008), available at http://www 
.gop.com/images/legal/2008_Rules_Adopted.pdf. Similarly, the Democratic Na-
tional Committee instituted a commission to study the nominations process 
and improve the caucus system by 2012. Jeff Zeleny, It’s Never Too Soon to 
Think About 2012, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2009, http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes 
.com/2009/03/23/its-never-to-soon-to-think-about-2012/. The final report vaguely 
recommends the Party’s Rules Committee undertake more detailed oversight of 
state caucus systems. See DEMOCRATIC NAT’L COMM., REPORT OF THE DEMO-
CRATIC CHANGE COMMISSION 20 (2009), available at http://www.thegreenpapers 
.com/P12/Democratic_Change_Commisison_Report-2009-12-30.pdf.  
 47. See, e.g., WANG, supra note 13, at 3. 
 48. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 49. Id. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 50. Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 586 (2005) (quoting Cal. Democrat-
ic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 574 (2000)). 
 51. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997); see 
also Lauren Hancock, Note, The Life of the Party: Analyzing Political Parties’ 
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Political parties also have a right to political association, 
which includes the right to determine their criteria for selecting 
delegates to their national conventions.52 However, this right is 
not limitless, even though the Supreme Court has not precisely 
defined the boundaries.53 In fact, in Cousins v. Wigoda, the 
Court was careful to leave the door open for future judicial in-
tervention into party nominations.54 In addition to individual 
and party rights, state governments also have legitimate inter-
ests in fair election administration.55 In the context of party 
nominations, these rights often conflict. 
The individual right to associate does not extend to partici-
pation in elections operated by private entities.56 In order for a 
disenfranchised voter to claim constitutional violation of her 
right to vote, a court must find that the state has acted in viola-
tion of a right.57 Traditionally, courts have viewed political par-
ties as private actors.58 However, the Supreme Court has 
pierced the shield of private organizations in instances when a 
party effectively acts as a state.59 For instance, in Allwright, 
the Court held that a party acted as the state in administering 
matters intimately connected with state authority.60 In Terry v. 
Adams, a local Democratic party required candidates to secure 
the nominations of a private club instead of the party itself.61 
The party’s ostensible purpose was to protect itself from the 
reach of the Fifteenth Amendment.62 However, the Court re-
jected a formalistic public-private distinction and held that the 
 
First Amendment Associational Rights when the Primary Election Process Is 
Construed Along a Continuum, 88 MINN. L. REV. 159, 169–71 (2003). 
 52. Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 487 (1975) (holding that an Illinois 
state law on delegate qualifications did not prevail over conflicting national 
party rules).  
 53. Bachur v. Democratic Nat’l Party, 836 F.2d 837, 841 (4th Cir. 1987). 
 54. Id. (stating that Cousins did not decide the extent to which the Court 
advised judicial intervention into party matters). 
 55. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974) (“[A]s a practical matter, 
there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and 
honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the demo-
cratic processes.”). 
 56. See, e.g., Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 86–89 (1932). 
 57. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (outlining the causes of a civil action for de-
privation of rights). 
 58. E.g., Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 656, 659–61 (1944); Nixon, 286 
U.S. at 86–89. 
 59. See Allwright, 321 U.S. at 663–64. 
 60. Id.  
 61. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 461 (1953). 
 62. Id. at 462–64. 
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Jaybird Association had taken state action within the scope of 
the Constitution.63 In essence, the Court found that the party’s 
action amounted to an attempt to hide a public action behind a 
private subterfuge.64 
Later cases have tended to favor party associational rights 
over state interests. In 1980, Wisconsin adopted open primaries 
in violation of the National Democratic Party’s rules.65 Demo-
cratic Party of the United States v. La Follette pitted state in-
terests in election administration against the right of the na-
tional party to define the boundaries of its political 
association.66 The Court held that a state could not constitu-
tionally compel a national party to seat delegates chosen in vi-
olation of the national party’s rules.67 While this was a decisive 
victory for political parties, the Court left several questions un-
answered. For instance, was the ruling limited to open primar-
ies? When should courts apply the white-primary cases—and 
thereby pierce the party structure—and when should they look 
to La Follette?  
In 2000, the Court moved further away from the earlier 
public-private distinction and toward stronger party rights.68 
California Democratic Party v. Jones involved a state attempt 
to institute a blanket primary over the objections of a state po-
litical party.69 It presented the question of whether a state leg-
islature had the constitutional authority to define the party’s 
political association so broadly.70 In conducting its analysis, the 
Court employed a “flexible” Burdick balancing test, which first 
measures the degree of injury to the plaintiff ’s First and Four-
teenth Amendment rights and then weighs it against interests 
claimed by the state to justify its actions.71 Even if the imposi-
tion on a party is “severely” burdensome, a state regulation 
may still survive the scrutiny if it is “narrowly drawn to ad-
vance a state interest of compelling importance.”72 Weighing 
the interests of the state in fair election administration against 
 
 63. Id. at 470. 
 64. See id.  
 65. Democratic Party of the U.S. v. Wis. ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 
109 (1980). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 126. 
 68. See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 586 (2000).  
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 569. 
 71. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992). 
 72. Id. (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992)). 
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the right of the party to define its association, the Supreme 
Court held 7-2 that the party’s right outweighed the compelling 
interests of the state.73  
Two recent cases appear to back away from La Follette and 
Jones. First, the Court in Washington State Grange v. Washing-
ton State Republican Party upheld a ballot initiative approved 
by voters that allows candidates to self-designate their party 
preference.74 The Party lost, despite its objection that voters 
would misinterpret the self-designated party label as a party 
nomination.75 In Clingman v. Beaver, the Court also employed 
a less absolutist party-or-state approach.76 It upheld a state-
created semi-closed primary in which registered members of a 
third party could not vote in the primary of a majority party 
(and vice versa).77 The Court underscored that states must 
have the authority to enact reasonable regulations of parties, 
elections, and ballots to reduce the risk of disorder.78 The out-
comes of these cases raise questions as to the future of associa-
tional rights jurisprudence. 
2. Equal Protection of Votes: One Person, One Vote 
The right to vote is fundamental to our political system.79 
Although the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly prescribe a 
right to vote, the Court has declared that voting is a fundamen-
tal right protected by the Constitution.80 The right to vote ex-
tends beyond the physical act of voting to the election proce-
dures that affect the proportional weight of one’s vote.81 The 
 
 73. See Jones, 530 U.S. at 568, 586 (indicating that the California law se-
verely and unnecessarily burdened the Democratic Party’s right to political 
association). 
 74. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 
444 (2008). 
 75. Id. at 448 (describing the Republican Party’s contention that the new 
system forced it to associate with candidates it did not endorse). 
 76. See Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 589–90 (2005). 
 77. Id. at 584–85. 
 78. Id. at 593. 
 79. CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF 
LAWS 13 (Anne M. Cohler et al. eds. & trans., 1989) (1748) (“Just as the divi-
sion of those having the right to vote is a fundamental law in the republic, the 
way of casting the vote is another fundamental law.”). 
 80. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966) (citing 
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 314–15 (1941)). 
 81. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (“The right to vote is protected 
in more than the initial allocation of the franchise.”). Although the Court 
stated that Bush was limited to its circumstances, multiple courts have since 
affirmed that voting extends beyond the initial franchise. See, e.g., League of 
  
1014 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [95:1003 
 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment82 also 
protects the right of voters to participate in elections on an 
equal basis with one another.83 A state may not value one per-
son’s vote over another’s by arbitrary and disparate treat-
ment.84 Effectively, this body of law commands the equal 
weight of votes in both theory and practice. 
The 2008 election fueled public discourse over the arbitrary 
weight assigned by parties to caucus votes.85 In Nevada, voters 
challenged an at-large caucus district because votes cast there 
had greater mathematical weight than at other caucuses.86 In 
Texas, voters litigated whether the Democratic Party can 
knowingly allot disproportionate values to caucus votes.87 In to-
tality, the caucus system raises grave concerns about the arbi-
 
Women Voters of Ohio v. Brunner, 548 F.3d 463, 477 (6th Cir. 2008) (applying 
Bush); In re Contest of Gen. Election Held on Nov. 4, 2008, for the Purpose of 
Electing a U.S. Senator from Minn., 767 N.W.2d 453, 465–66 (Minn. 2009) 
(same). 
 82. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall . . . deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 83. See supra notes 74–75. The Court has stated that “all who participate 
in the election are to have an equal vote—whatever their race, whatever their 
sex, whatever their occupation, whatever their income, and wherever their 
home may be in that geographical unit.” Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 557–
58 (1964) (quoting Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379–80 (1963)). 
 84. Bush, 531 U.S. at 104–05. 
 85. See, e.g., Shailagh Murray, After Nevada Caucuses, Charges of Foul 
Play, WASH. POST BLOG (Jan. 20, 2008, 6:56 PM), http://blog.washingtonpost 
.com/44/2008/01/20/after_nevada_caucuses_charges.html. In the public com-
ments to the article, caucus-goers from across the state described their nega-
tive experiences, like waiting in lines for hours. Id. One voter was shocked to 
learn, after being elected a delegate, that she would have to pay thirty-five dol-
lars to attend the next caucus. Id. 
 86. David McGrath Schwartz, Ruling on Strip Voting Looks Likely Today, 
LAS VEGAS SUN, Jan. 17, 2008, http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2008/jan/17/ 
Strip_voting/. Ultimately, a federal district court held in favor of the Nevada 
Democratic Party in a bench decision, finding that parties may set up their 
own caucus guidelines if they do not discriminate against voters based on race, 
gender, or religion. See June Kronholz, Judge Upholds Nevada’s Casino Cau-
cuses, WALL ST. J. WASH. WIRE (Jan. 1, 2008, 5:12 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/ 
washwire/2008/01/17/judge-upholds-nevadas-casino-caucuses/; Adrienne Pack-
er, Judge OKs At-Large Caucuses on Strip, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Jan. 18, 2008, 
http://www.lvrj.com/news/13891177.html. 
 87. See LULAC of Tex. v. Tex. Democratic Party, 651 F. Supp. 2d 700, 
700–02 (W.D. Tex. 2009) (finding that the portion of the Voting Rights Act re-
quiring a political party to preclear delegate allocation formulas did not im-
permissibly infringe on the party’s associational rights, but not deciding 
whether the Texas Democratic Party’s delegate allocation plan discriminated 
against minority voters on account of race or color). 
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trary and disproportionate weight assigned to factors like 
wealth, health, and geography.88 
3. Twenty-Fourth Amendment Poll Tax 
The Twenty-Fourth Amendment states that the right of 
citizens to vote “shall not be denied or abridged by the United 
States or any state by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or 
other tax.”89 The Court overturned a poll tax in Harman v. 
Forssenius on the basis of the amendment, but has otherwise 
largely avoided its application.90 In a later decision, Harper v. 
Virginia Board of Elections, the Court invalidated a poll tax, 
but on Fourteenth Amendment equal protection grounds.91 Cat-
egorized by some as “the most insignificant” amendment,92 the 
Twenty-Fourth Amendment’s sparse history suggests that 
courts are hesitant to consider in their voting-rights jurispru-
dence the disproportionate effects of voting-related costs on less 
affluent voters. However, with the recent movement by state 
legislatures to require voters to present government-issued 
identification at the polls, courts are encountering a resurgent 
body of poll tax-related litigation.93 Indeed, with increasing 
state budget constraints and the possibility that state and local 
governments might attempt to pass election administration 
costs onto voters, some legal scholars suggest that litigators 
should define the contours of the amendment before “it makes a 
difference in a charged political context.”94 
Looking to the history of the amendment, courts have 
treated its passage as an attempt to sever the link between 
wealth and voting eligibility.95 Harman, for example, presented 
 
 88. Cf. id. 
 89. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1 (emphasis added). 
 90. Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 544 (1965); see also Allison 
R. Hayward, What Is an Unconstitutional “Other Tax” on Voting? Construing 
the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, 8 ELECTION L.J. 103, 104, 117–22 (2009). 
 91. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966). 
 92. T.R.B. from Washington, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 9, 1963, at 2. 
 93. See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 198–99 
(2008). 
 94. Hayward, supra note 90, at 122.  
 95. See Harper, 383 U.S. at 668; David Schultz & Sarah Clark, Wealth v. 
Democracy: The Unfulfilled Promise of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment 4–5 
(2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://works.bepress.com/david_ 
schultz/14/ (arguing that the Supreme Court and Congress understood the 
amendment to be a broad rejection of the link between wealth and voting). For 
a more comprehensive history of property tests in voting, see KIRK H. PORTER, 
A HISTORY OF SUFFRAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 77–111 (1969). 
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the issue of whether Virginia could constitutionally require a 
voter to either pay a poll tax or file a certificate of residency.96 
The majority said that the legislative history of the amendment 
illustrated Congress’s “repugnance to the disenfranchisement 
of the poor occasioned by failure to pay [a poll] tax.”97 The 
Court emphasized that even negligible taxes that impose only a 
slight economical obstacle violate the amendment.98 The major-
ity also noted that voter turnout in poll tax states was low com-
pared to the eligible voting population.99 Since the amendment 
states that the right to vote shall not be “denied or abridged,”100 
the Harman Court stated that the amendment’s language “nul-
lifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes” of voting 
impairment.101 In Harper, the Court similarly concluded that to 
introduce wealth or payment of a fee as a measurement of vot-
ing qualifications would be to introduce a capricious or irrele-
vant factor.102 
Recent voter identification cases have challenged courts to 
incorporate the financial burdens on voters as a factor in decid-
ing voting-rights litigation. In Crawford v. Marion County, the 
Court held that the compelling state interests in requiring pho-
to identification sufficiently justified the burden it imposed on 
voters.103 Although the petitioner did not make a Twenty-
Fourth Amendment claim, the majority acknowledged that ad-
missible evidence demonstrating the burden the law placed on 
voters might comprise a constitutional objection.104 In Common 
Cause/Georgia v. Billups, the Eleventh Circuit upheld a simi-
lar voter identification law after weighing the state’s interest in 
electoral integrity against the burden on voters of procuring 
 
 96. Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 538 (1965). 
 97. Id. at 539. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. That the Court identified a correlation between voting taxes and 
low voter turnout is particularly applicable to the caucus context because cau-
cuses have drastically lower turnout than primaries. See, e.g., McDonald, su-
pra note 10. 
 100. U.S. CONST. amend XXIV, § 1 (emphasis added).  
 101. Harman, 380 U.S. at 540–41 (quoting Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 
275 (1939)). 
 102. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966) (“‘A citizen, a 
qualified voter, is no more or no less so because he lived in the city or on the 
farm.’ . . . We say the same whether the citizen, otherwise qualified to vote, 
has $1.50 in his pocket or nothing at all . . . .” (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 
U.S. 533, 568 (1964))).  
 103. See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 198–99 (2008). 
 104. Id. at 202–03. 
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voter identification.105 However, the circuit court highlighted a 
key fact that the identification was available to voters for free, 
which may not be true of all voter identification schemes.106 It 
is also noteworthy that while the court required the state to 
identify a compelling interest, it did not require the state to 
prove that voter identification was necessary to prevent voter 
fraud.107 In other cases, however, courts have overturned voter 
identification requirements. For instance, in Winschenk v. Mis-
souri, the Missouri Supreme Court distinguished the contro-
versy from the voter identification schemes in Indiana and 
Georgia by highlighting that the plaintiffs provided empirical 
evidence illustrating the burden on voters to acquire the proper 
identification.108 Such costs convinced the court that the plain-
tiffs had satisfied both strict scrutiny and the lesser burden of 
the Burdick test.109 
Drawing from this jurisprudence, potential plaintiffs have 
colorable constitutional challenges to the caucus system under 
the First, Fourteenth, and Twenty-Fourth Amendments. 
II.  LITIGATING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE 
ATTENDANCE REQUIREMENT   
Although some scholars maintain that state regulation of 
caucuses constitutes impermissible government intervention,110 
federal case law suggests that there is room for alternative in-
terpretations of the constitutional relationship between parties, 
voters, and the state. This Part analyzes three central argu-
ments for challenging the caucus attendance rule: first, that 
the associational rights of voters outweigh those of party associ-
ational rights; second, that caucuses may violate the equal pro-
tection doctrine by allocating unequal weight to votes; and, 
third, that the financial burdens of caucuses may constitute a 
poll tax. Under this analysis, the caucus attendance require-
ment may be unconstitutional under First Amendment associa-
tion rights doctrine and Fourteenth Amendment equal protec-
 
 105. Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 554 F.3d 1340, 1353–55 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 1353.  
 108. See Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201, 214 (Mo. 2006). 
 109. Id. at 216 (deciding ultimately to apply strict scrutiny). While the 
court acknowledged that the Missouri state constitution appeared to offer 
more voter protection than the U.S. Constitution, it was not clear that it was 
dispositive. Id. 
 110. See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 17. 
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tion, and questionable under the Twenty-Fourth Amendment’s 
prohibition of poll and other voting taxes. 
A. THE ASSOCIATIONAL RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUAL VOTERS 
OUTWEIGH PARTY RIGHTS 
In the white-primary cases, the Court rejected a formalistic 
public-private distinction to hold that private action sometimes 
constitutes state action. The logic of the white-primary cases is 
applicable to present-day caucuses. This section posits that po-
litical parties, in administering caucuses, take state action. 
Further, it argues that if courts were to conceptualize party as-
sociational rights as a collection of individual associational 
rights, there is a strong argument that courts should prioritize 
individual rights over those of the party.  
In Terry v. Adams, the Court emphasized the overall effect 
of the private action rather than restricting the concept of state 
action to a formal distinction between public and private enti-
ties.111 Terry found that the state, in permitting party-operated 
primaries, had effectively sanctioned the unconstitutional ac-
tivity.112 Thus, if a state permits a party to operate an uncons-
titutional caucus, it may also sanction an unconstitutional ac-
tivity. 
By contrast, in its ruling in Jones, the Supreme Court held 
that the party’s associational rights outweighed the compelling 
interests of the state.113 Although this most recent articulation 
affirms the associational rights of parties when pitted against 
less-than-compelling state interests, it does not directly com-
pare the associational rights of a party to those of individual 
party voters, as do the white-primary cases.114 Therefore, Jones 
does not stand for the proposition that party associational 
rights will always trump individual associational rights.  
Although parties have substantial freedom to determine 
the rules by which they select presidential electors,115 neither 
Jones nor La Follette—which pitted a state’s interest in election 
 
 111. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469–70 (1953) (“It is immaterial that 
the state does not control that part of this elective process which it leaves for 
the Jaybirds to manage. . . . The effect of the whole procedure . . . is to do pre-
cisely that which the Fifteenth Amendment forbids . . . .”). 
 112. See id.; supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text (describing Smith v. 
Allwright and the Court’s disapproval of white-only primaries). 
 113. See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 582, 585–86 (2000). 
 114. See id. 
 115. See id.; Democratic Party of the U.S. v. Wis. ex rel. La Follette, 450 
U.S. 107, 122 (1980). 
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administration against a national party’s right to define its po-
litical association—measured the associational rights of party 
voters against the party. Conceptualizing a party as an entity 
comprised of its members, the party unit becomes nothing more 
than a collection of individual associational rights. By defend-
ing the party unit at the expense of the individual voters, a 
court would undermine the more vital associational rights of 
voters in favor of a nonhuman entity. It is also noteworthy that 
the regulations invalidated in Jones and La Follette were ex-
ceptional examples of state intervention.116 In both cases, a 
state attempted to define a party’s political association for the 
party by opening its primaries to voters not ideologically 
aligned with the party.117 Caucus reform policies under which 
parties retain substantial autonomy to define their association 
likely would not trigger nor violate Jones or La Follette 
precedent, making it more likely that a court would uphold a 
party member’s associational rights challenge.  
In a case between a party and potential caucus-goers, a 
court would likely begin by employing the “flexible” two-part 
Burdick balancing test.118 First, a court would assess the mag-
nitude of the asserted injury to the plaintiff ’s First and Four-
teenth Amendment rights.119 Then, a court would weigh 
whether the precise state or party interests outweigh the in-
jury.120 Thus, in order for a potential litigant to establish a 
claim, she would need to prove that a party’s physical atten-
dance requirement abridged her right to associate121—a rela-
tively straightforward argument for someone who was literally 
unable to attend due to military deployment, and a more diffi-
cult but still feasible contention for someone who could not 
leave work during caucus hours. The litigant would also need to 
convince a court that her individual rights are more compelling 
than the party’s interest.122  
For instance, assume that litigants challenged a state par-
ty’s physical attendance requirement. A party might defend its 
associational rights by asserting that it has a right to define the 
 
 116. See Jones, 530 U.S. at 570; La Follette, 450 U.S. at 110–12. 
 117. See Jones, 530 U.S. at 570; La Follette, 450 U.S. at 110–12. 
 118. La Follette, 450 U.S. at 110–12. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. See id. 
 122. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992); La Follette, 450 U.S. 
at 110–12. 
  
1020 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [95:1003 
 
contours of its political association. However, a party cannot es-
tablish that a court ruling against a physical attendance re-
quirement would be paramount to a Jones infringement on its 
associational rights.123 Depending on the remedy—such as 
whether the court issued an injunction or required a party to 
provide an alternative or absentee process—a party probably 
cannot successfully argue that elimination of the physical at-
tendance requirement would open its caucus doors to people 
with whom a party would not otherwise associate. Those voters 
would already be eligible to caucus with the party. In fact, the 
voters who would take advantage of an alternative process like 
an absentee ballot are people who would participate but for the 
prohibitive attendance requirement. In contrast to a party, a 
potential caucus voter has an equal, if not more compelling, as-
sociational right to participate in the caucus process.124  
Alternatively, suppose that a state legislature enacted a 
mandatory absentee process for state party caucuses. In a court 
case challenging the absentee process, a party would probably 
assert the same arguments as discussed in the previous hypo-
thetical, claiming that it infringes on its associational rights. 
However, the state could argue that it had several compelling 
reasons for regulating the caucus process: increasing access for 
persons with disabilities,125 increasing voter participation,126 
improving election administration, and enhancing voter confi-
dence in a highly criticized system.127 It could also argue that it 
reformed the law specifically because the attendance require-
ment violates the associational rights of caucus-goers. One ad-
vantage to this approach is that precedent exists establishing a 
state’s compelling interest in fair, accessible elections. Even if a 
court found the state’s requirements “severely” burdensome on 
the party, the state regulation could still survive judicial scru-
tiny if it was “narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of 
 
 123. See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000) (finding that 
the law forced parties to associate with those who did not share their beliefs).  
 124. See, e.g., Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 82 (1932) (finding that a state 
cannot deny participation in a primary based on race); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 
U.S. 536, 541 (1927) (addressing a similar law in which primary voting was 
determined by race). 
 125. See infra note 147 and accompanying text. 
 126. See Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 609 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (“States do have a valid interest in conducting orderly elections and in en-
couraging the maximum participation . . . .”). 
 127. See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 439–40. 
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compelling importance.”128 Given this framework, states, too, 
may have a strong claim to regulate some aspects of party ac-
tivity, particularly given that states have a lower burden of 
proof than parties in this context.129 
Two recent cases give additional weight to the argument 
that litigants might prevail on an associational rights challenge 
to the caucus attendance requirement. First, in Washington 
State Grange, which upheld a referendum allowing candidates 
to self-select their party affiliation, the Supreme Court took a 
more flexible, less formalistic approach to state party interests 
than in Jones.130 The Court underscored a state’s power to pre-
scribe the time, place, and manner of elections for federal and 
state offices.131 The opinion also reiterated that the Court has 
repeatedly upheld reasonable, politically neutral regulations 
that have the effect of channeling expressive activity at the 
polls.132 Finally, the Court rejected the state party’s attempt to 
extend the Jones decision by arguing that the primary system 
opened the party to outsiders.133 The majority opinion suggests 
that Jones is not a broad rule guiding all associational rights 
litigation, but one limited to severe, demonstrable infringe-
ments. 
In a second recent case, Clingman v. Beaver, the Court also 
recognized the right of states to intervene in certain party op-
erations.134 Upholding a restriction that members of a third 
party could not vote in the majority party’s primary, the Court 
underscored that states must be able to enact reasonable regu-
lations of parties, elections, and ballots to reduce the risk of 
election disorder.135 Although Clingman affirms a party’s right 
to define its political association, it appears to back away from 
Jones and indicates that the Court is willing to engage in a 
closer, fact-specific analysis. 
 
 128. Id. at 434 (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992)). 
 129. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 208–09 (1992) (applying a 
modified burden, which does not require empirical proof by the state of elec-
tion fraud for cases in which a First Amendment right threatens to interfere 
with the act of voting, such as voter confusion or when the activity physically 
interferes with a voter’s ability to cast a ballot). Such a modified burden would 
likely apply to caucuses. See id. 
 130. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 
444, 442–59 (2008). 
 131. Id. at 451. 
 132. Id. at 452. 
 133. Id. at 452–53. 
 134. See Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 589–90 (2005). 
 135. Id. at 593–94, 598. 
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Currently, political parties have substantial latitude to de-
fine their political association,136 and the lack of direct govern-
ment regulation of caucuses allows parties free reign to dictate 
the parameters of caucus participants’ associational rights. Po-
litical parties, through caucuses, can narrow a field of candi-
dates in a race from a dozen to one, making pre-general elec-
tions crucial fora for meaningful political association.137 Thus, 
in organizing caucuses, political parties have considerable pow-
er and administer matters intimately connected with state au-
thority. 
The Court’s associational rights jurisprudence leaves the 
door open for successful litigation that the caucus attendance 
requirement is a violation of the First Amendment association-
al rights of voters. Although litigants pursuing this line of ar-
gumentation will likely face a state-action challenge, the Court 
has pierced private entities when their primaries are a part of 
the essential election machinery of a state and could do so in 
the case of caucuses. 
B. CAUCUSES MAY VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION DOCTRINE 
THROUGH VOTE DILUTION 
The caucus attendance requirement also presents a possi-
ble equal protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Since an inflexible all-or-nothing attendance requirement di-
vides voters into classes based on arbitrary factors, it may un-
constitutionally and disproportionately dilute votes.138 There 
are, however, two significant hurdles to making this argument 
in court: first, providing a factual basis to illustrate electoral 
irregularity; and, second, establishing discrimination.139 None-
theless, with appropriate documentation, litigants could make 
 
 136. See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 574–76 (2000); Ri-
chard L. Hasen, Too Plain for Argument? The Uncertain Congressional Power 
to Require Parties to Choose Presidential Nominees Through Direct and Equal 
Primaries, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 2009, 2014–16 (2008). 
 137. A number of cases suggest that primary elections are more important 
for political association than general elections. See, e.g., Clingman, 544 U.S. at 
599–600 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (finding that primaries dictate the range of 
choices available by voters in the general election); Cal. Democratic Party, 530 
U.S. at 575 (noting that primaries are a “crucial juncture” in the electoral 
process). 
 138. See LULAC of Tex. v. Tex. Democratic Party, 651 F. Supp. 2d 700, 
701–03 (W.D. Tex. 2009); Schwartz, supra note 86. 
 139. See League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Brunner, 548 F.3d 463, 476–78 
(6th Cir. 2008). 
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a strong argument that caucuses unequally and arbitrarily dis-
qualify voters.  
Caucuses are relatively informal gatherings that have an 
immense impact on elections. Caucuses vary by county, state 
legislative district, and precinct.140 Since there are few control-
ling state laws, uneven training among caucus volunteers, and 
limited institutional knowledge in some localities, there is ex-
treme irregularity in the treatment of votes.141 Arbitrary dis-
crimination, even without intentionally targeting a suspect 
class, may violate the Equal Protection Clause by unconstitu-
tionally violating the one person, one vote doctrine.142 One sim-
ple illustration of arbitrary discrimination is that caucuses al-
low biased voters to count the ballots rather than neutral 
administrators.143 This method can affect the weight of votes 
from one precinct to the next. Another potential source of dis-
crimination is the intimidation factor: caucuses discourage par-
ticipation by people who are hesitant to publicly announce and 
defend their votes.144 Most concerning of all, however, the at-
tendance requirement forces people to attend caucuses at the 
expense of other significant life responsibilities145 or constitu-
tionally protected rights, such as the free practice of religion.146 
It also requires people who are disabled or homebound to either 
make precarious trips to their caucus sites, possibly standing 
uncomfortably for hours, or surrender their franchise altogeth-
er.147 
 
 140. See Mayer, supra note 11, at 108. 
 141. See Tom McCarthy, Nebraska Caucus: Omayhem, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Feb. 9, 2008, 4:08 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tom-mccarthy/nebraska 
-caucus-omayhem_b_85841.html (describing the problems surrounding a Ne-
braska caucus). 
 142. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 557–58 (1964); Black v. McGuf-
fage, 209 F. Supp. 2d 889, 898–99 (N.D. Ill. 2002). 
 143. See Pearson, supra note 16 (“Every ballot counter . . . wore a T-shirt or 
button in support of the same candidate. So much for neutrality in election 
administration.”). 
 144. See, e.g., Ralph Thomas, Caucus? Primary? Voters Here Can Do Both, 
SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 28, 2008, at A1, available at 2008 WLNR 1657266 (par-
aphrasing a former Washington Secretary of State who contends that caucuses 
require people to argue with their neighbors about politics); Wilentz & Zelizer, 
supra note 9, at B3. 
 145. See, e.g., Kantor, supra note 8, at A1. 
 146. See, e.g., Krieger, supra note 1, at 1. 
 147. See WANG, supra note 13, at 5; Gail Collins, Op-ed., Notes From a 
Caucus, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2008, at A35, available at 2008 WLNR 2833178 
(attesting that a woman on chemotherapy had to leave the caucus for health 
reasons after several hours of waiting and never voting). 
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Recent litigation after Bush v. Gore presents a promising 
model for an equal protection challenge of caucuses. In League 
of Women Voters of Ohio v. Brunner, plaintiffs successfully 
overcame a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim by il-
lustrating compelling examples of gross disparities between 
polling locations in a primary based on geographic differenc-
es.148 The court held that such allegations were sufficient to 
state an equal protection claim. The equal protection claim fo-
cused on discrepancies in the following procedures: registra-
tion, absentee ballots, polling places by location (including the 
amount of time travelling to polling places and polling places 
that did not open on time), lack of training among poll workers, 
and unfair treatment of disabled voters.149  
Plaintiffs may be required to prove not just discrimination 
but intentional discrimination to win equal protection claims.150 
The court in Brunner did not decide the issue because it was 
not the precise matter before the court. However, in Washing-
ton v. Davis, the Court held that intentional discrimination is 
not the only form of discrimination prohibited by the Constitu-
tion.151 Irrational and arbitrary debasement of a vote violates 
equal protection, “[e]ven without a suspect classification or in-
vidious discrimination.”152 Nevertheless, with careful discovery, 
plaintiffs may also be able to demonstrate intentional153 or 
knowing discrimination,154 bolstering their equal protection vi-
olation claim.  
 
 148. League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Brunner, 548 F.3d 463, 477–78 
(6th Cir. 2008). To state a claim, a complaint must allege (1) deprivation of a 
constitutional right, (2) by a person acting under color of the law. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 (2006); Jones v. Duncan, 840 F.2d 359, 361–62 (6th Cir. 1988). 
 149. League of Women Voters of Ohio, 548 F.3d at 468–69. Since party cau-
cuses are technically independent from the state, uniform disability laws do 
not apply. See PENIEL CRONIN, 2008 DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCE 
ELECTION: PRIMARY VERSUS CAUCUS 1 (2008), available at http://www.talkleft 
.com/media/2008caucusreport.pdf; WANG, supra note 13, at 5 (discussing how 
disability laws do not apply to or are not enforced at caucuses). This raises the 
possibility of a fundamental right to access claim. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 
U.S. 509, 533–34 (2004) (holding that Title II of the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act implicates a fundamental right of access enforceable by Congress un-
der the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 150. League of Women Voters of Ohio, 548 F.3d at 476. 
 151. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240–41 (1976). 
 152. Black v. McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d 889, 899 (N.D. Ill. 2002). 
 153. See, e.g., STEVEN SCHIER, BY INVITATION ONLY: THE RISE OF 
EXCLUSIVE POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES 31 (2000). 
 154. See, e.g., WANG, supra note 13, at 3 (discussing the debate among 
Iowa election officials over who they would exclude based on when they sched-
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Litigants appear to be having some success in challenging 
arbitrary election procedures on equal protection grounds. In 
the caucus context, the inflexible all-or-nothing attendance rule 
arbitrarily excludes voters, making it potentially fertile ground 
for an equal protection dispute. 
C. CAUCUSES MAY CONSTITUTE AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL POLL 
TAX 
The caucus attendance requirement may also violate the 
Twenty-Fourth Amendment because the associated financial 
burden of voting in a caucus amounts to a poll tax. The atten-
dance requirement effectively forces voters who would other-
wise vote absentee in a primary to pay to participate in a cau-
cus.155  
In an attempt to define the amendment’s parameters, elec-
tion-law scholar Allison Hayward proposed a rule to define “poll 
or other tax.”156 For a tax or fee to be invalid under her rule, it 
must be a mandatory cost directly tied to voting.157 Taxes or 
fees owed irrespective of voting—such as costs paid for licenses 
that drivers would obtain anyway or avoidable transportation 
costs—would be constitutional under her proposed rule.158 
Hayward argued that a poll tax claim may actually be stronger 
than an equal protection claim because equal protection chal-
lenges to voting taxes largely depend on the “proclivities of 
judges,” but it is harder for a judge to “reason away” a Twenty-
Fourth Amendment standard.159 Thus, the latter could be a 
more stable and powerful argument in applicable contexts.160 
By contrast, other commentators argue that a poll or other tax 
“should be read to include any monetized cost which directly or 
indirectly imposes an additional cost on voters in their casting 
of a vote such that it would discourage individuals from vot-
 
uled the caucus); Krieger, supra note 1, at 1 (describing how the party knew 
that holding the 2008 Nevada caucus on a Saturday would exclude Orthodox 
Jews, but decided to do it anyway). 
 155. See Kantor, supra note 8, at A1 (describing one person who would 
miss the caucus because he was an evening cook who could not leave work and 
another who had to care for her autistic child). Homebound or disabled voters 
may require unique, expensive transportation in order to attend their caucus-
es. See WANG, supra note 13, at 5.  
 156. See Hayward, supra note 90, at 118. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 119–20. 
 160. Id. 
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ing.”161 They contend that their broader test better addresses 
poll tax “substitutes” and Hayward’s test creates a self-
defeating loophole.162 They also suggest that one existing politi-
cal practice that may fall within the scope of the amendment is 
the caucus system.163 
Employing either test, litigants may be able to persuade a 
court that there are costs directly associated to caucuses that 
would be absent in primaries or other forms of voting. Litigants 
should emphasize the two most significant differences between 
voting in primaries and caucuses: actual, physical attendance 
and the narrow time period of caucuses. First, plaintiffs should 
produce evidence of the added financial burden that physically 
going to their caucus locations could cost them. Examples 
might include transportation costs for a student attending col-
lege away from home or a person who must leave a child or an 
aging parent with a paid caregiver. Second, voters should argue 
that the narrow voting time frame of caucuses causes specific 
hardship that would not be present in a primary situation, like 
leaving work to attend a caucus. Although there is limited poll 
tax case law, litigants have had some success with similar ar-
guments in voter identification cases.164  
Political caucuses impose direct and indirect burdens on 
voters. Real cost data exist on the trade-offs caucus voters face 
in casting their caucus ballots.165 By employing empirical data 
on burdens produced by the mandatory attendance require-
ment, litigants may be able to establish that the caucus attend-
ance requirement is an unconstitutional poll or other tax. 
III.  IMPROVING THE NOMINATIONS PROCESS: 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM   
Although this Note has thus far focused on potential court 
challenges to caucuses, it also speaks to legislatures and party 
leaders, acknowledging that they may be more effective actors 
to achieve uniform caucus reform. This Part presents four 
reform proposals for eliminating or mitigating the burdens cau-
 
 161. See Schultz & Clark, supra note 95, at 63 (emphasis added). 
 162. Id. at 63–64. 
 163. See id. at 76. 
 164. See, e.g., Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201, 209–10 (Mo. 2006) 
(overturning a state voter-identification statute after finding that the statute 
placed a substantial burden on the fundamental right to vote and was not nar-
rowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest). 
 165. See CRONIN, supra note 149, at 1. 
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cuses place on individual constitutional rights and briefly 
summarizes the comparative advantages and disadvantages of 
pursuing reform through various actors. It concludes that Con-
gress is best suited to legislatively and uniformly reform cau-
cuses. 
A. REFORM RECOMMENDATIONS 
The first proposal is to eliminate caucuses entirely. This 
would produce the best outcome, as it would resolve the consti-
tutional infirmities of caucuses.166 However, this may be politi-
cally infeasible. Several key actors hold competing interests 
and the mode of implementation of reform is a critical consid-
eration for maintaining a fair, workable balance. For example, 
if courts were to intervene by replacing caucuses with primar-
ies, such reform may come at the cost of party independence. 
Elimination of caucuses may also violate the Burdick test, 
which requires such burdensome intervention to be as narrowly 
tailored as possible.167 It is unclear whether state interests in 
caucus reform justify such significant judicial intervention. 
Therefore, this Note presents several less intrusive alternatives 
that a consensus of actors is more likely to support. Neverthe-
less, there is room in federal precedent for an argument that 
the potential constitutional violations of caucuses this Note 
presents necessitate their elimination.168 
A second proposal is the addition of an absentee ballot op-
tion to caucuses. In 2004, the Maine Democratic Party insti-
tuted an absentee voting process for its precinct caucuses.169 In 
2008, of its approximately 45,000 presidential preference bal-
lots cast, 5000 were submitted absentee.170 Using Maine as a 
model, parties could provide for an absentee ballot option that 
would operate similarly to a primary election absentee ballot. 
Since some caucus states have a minimum threshold rule,171 
 
 166. It is beyond the scope of this Note to discuss the merits of regional and 
direct national primaries, but this analysis contends that either of these pri-
mary systems would better address the constitutional concerns presented by 
the attendance requirement than caucuses in their present form. 
 167. See, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992). 
 168. See Am. Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 781 (1974) (upholding a 
state’s regulation of party activity by instituting a caucus instead of a primary). 
 169. See Manning Interview, supra note 45. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Threshold rules require candidates to receive a minimum percentage 
of the vote in order to earn delegates. Like instant run-off voting, a candidate 
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voters could rank their presidential candidates in order of 
preference in case their top choices were eliminated.172 
This proposal illustrates a simple, voluntary process that 
state or national parties could adopt. Although this proposal 
does not entirely remedy associational rights or equal protec-
tion violations, it does mitigate them by expanding voter access 
and increasing caucus legitimacy by making participation easi-
er. Additionally, it would effectively eliminate the financial 
burden placed upon individuals unable to participate, thereby 
resolving the poll tax issue. Nonetheless, two practical concerns 
impede adoption: funding and party control. The administra-
tive costs of creating, mailing, and counting absentee ballots, as 
well as optional efforts to publicize an absentee ballot option to 
potential voters, are unappetizing to many party leaders and 
may outweigh their genuine desires to improve the caucus 
process.173 A second detractor to the absentee option is cam-
paign control. Modern campaigns operate by microtargeting 
and activating likely caucus-goers.174 Implementing an absen-
tee process would require campaigns to predict which voters 
will participate by absentee.175 Campaigns are often closely 
connected to the political parties making caucus administration 
decisions and these initial hassles may influence a party’s deci-
sion to create an absentee ballot option. Nonetheless, this alone 
is not a sufficient reason to forgo efforts at caucus reform. Fur-
thermore, this may give parties the satisfaction of crafting their 
own plans for increasing caucus accessibility, rather than forc-
ing parties to comply with an outside agent’s mandate. 
A third reform proposal is to employ new technology to in-
crease long-distance participation. One example is a supple-
mental Internet voting scheme. In 2004, the Michigan Demo-
cratic Party allowed caucus voters to either attend a traditional 
 
without this number is eliminated and his or her supporters’ votes are redis-
tributed to remaining candidates. See Mayer, supra note 11, at 111 tbl.4.1. 
 172. Id. At precinct caucuses, voters also select the party delegates who 
will attend the next caucus level. Id. at 108. Since the delegates often an-
nounce their intention to run at the caucus, under this proposal voters unable 
to attend the caucus would only vote for their presidential preference, not spe-
cific individual delegates. Id. 
 173. See Manning Interview, supra note 45. 
 174. See SCHIER, supra note 153, at 31. 
 175. See Telephone Interview with Mark Brewer, Chair, Mich. Democratic 
Party (Nov. 21, 2009) [hereinafter Brewer Interview] (discussing the initial 
negative reaction of some campaigns to the influx of new voters within the 
context of Internet voting). 
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caucus, vote by mail, or submit votes online.176 The party stated 
that it implemented the online option to increase voter partici-
pation.177 The party employed “state-of-the-art” security and a 
system to guard against double-voting,178 and allowed voters a 
five-week voting window.179 A similar proposal is a virtual cau-
cus.180 Voters would enter a forum administered by the party, 
chat through instant messaging to form alliances, and vote.181 
The virtual caucus would still have to satisfy the same legal 
standards as a physical caucus, which means that votes must 
be equal and cannot be diluted. A third possibility is a public 
television access system. Voters could participate by watching 
the caucus on television and then submitting their votes either 
through the Internet or by telephone, using verification infor-
mation unique to an individual voter.  
An online or supplemental Internet voting scheme would 
mitigate, but not resolve, the possible associational rights and 
equal protection concerns. Like absentee ballots, it would give 
voters more options and limit the party-initiated burden of the 
attendance requirement. Nonetheless, the attendance require-
ment would still exclude some people. Perhaps the most signifi-
cant flaw in using Internet technology is the disproportionate 
lack of access to computers for certain segments of society, in-
cluding lower economic classes, racial minorities, and people 
lacking computer literacy.182 Additionally, Internet technology 
does not necessarily eliminate the financial poll tax burden of 
caucuses for people without Internet access. Recognizing this 
problem, a member of the Democratic National Committee 
challenged Michigan’s online voting proposal in 2004, but the 
committee nonetheless approved it.183 In response, campaigns 
tried to bridge the digital divide by bringing laptops to poten-
 
 176. See Robert E. Pierre & Dan Keating, Online Voting Clicks in Michi-
gan; Internet Ballots Part of Caucuses, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 2004, at A12; 
Brewer Interview, supra note 175. 
 177. Brewer Interview, supra note 175. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Priya Chatwani, Note, Retro Politics Back in Vogue: A Look at How 
the Internet Can Modernize the Reemerging Caucus, 14 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 
313, 324 (2005).  
 181. Id. at 324–31. As in an actual caucus, participants could choose to 
vote uncommitted. Id.  
 182. See NewsHour with Jim Lehrer (PBS television broadcast Feb. 6, 2004), 
available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/media/jan-june04/michiganinternet_ 
02-06.html. 
 183. See Pierre & Keating, supra note 176, at A12. 
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tial voters at their jobs, nursing homes, and schools.184 None-
theless, those targeted efforts did not eliminate the greater 
problem of disproportionate access.  
A fourth and final reform proposal is to shift from caucuses 
to a hybrid caucus-primary system, or spread the caucus over 
two or more days. This proposal would not eliminate the at-
tendance requirement but would widen the timeframe for par-
ticipation. Some states have debated splitting caucuses into one 
weekday and one weekend, of which voters would only have to 
attend one.185 The Texas Democratic Party offers another mod-
el. It instituted a two-step process for selecting delegates, com-
bining a daytime state-operated primary with a nighttime par-
ty caucus.186 The votes in the primary election account for two-
thirds of the total delegates selected for a candidate and the 
caucus accounts for the remaining one-third.187 This system, or 
a tweaked version of it, is a step closer to avoiding the more 
significant constitutional burdens on associational and equal 
protection rights associated with caucuses, but it does not elim-
inate them. Further, some litigants have challenged in court 
the complexity of the Texas system.188 They have maintained 
that the system is fundamentally unfair because it treats votes 
disproportionately.189 With these concerns in mind, this Note 
does not endorse a Texas-like system, but does recognize the 
underlying efforts of such a system to address the fundamental 
unfairness of the traditional caucus attendance requirement.  
B. EVALUATING THE BEST ACTORS TO INITIATE CAUCUS 
REFORM 
Some nonjudicial actors have the authority—but perhaps 
not the capacity—to reform the caucus system. This section ex-
amines the most likely actors and concludes that Congress is 
the best nonjudicial entity to reform the nominations process. 
Perhaps the most effective, legitimate source for regulating 
caucuses is Congress. The Constitution gives Congress the 
 
 184. Id.; NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, supra note 182. 
 185. See David Yespen, Double the Fun: Split the Dates for Caucuses, DES 
MOINES REG., Oct. 4, 2007, at A13, available at 2007 WLNR 27441192. 
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EL PASO TIMES, Oct. 5, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 22091567. 
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power to regulate federal elections in at least two clauses. First, 
the Presidential Election Clause grants Congress the power to 
set the time and day for choosing presidential electors.190 
Second, the Congressional Election Clause gives Congress the 
power to regulate the time, place, and manner of elections for 
U.S. senators and representatives.191 Additionally, Congress 
has at least some power to affect elections under its military 
authority.192 For example, Congress may be able to take some 
actions to change the nominations process as applied to mem-
bers of the military. Although no clause expressly grants Con-
gress the power to regulate the nominations process, the Su-
preme Court has recognized broad congressional power to 
regulate both general elections and primaries. In United States 
v. Classic, for example, the Court held that the Congressional 
Election Clause grants Congress authority to regulate primar-
ies for congressional elections when they are “integral” to the 
election process.193 Additionally, in Buckley v. Valeo, the Court 
upheld Congress’s campaign finance regulation of presidential 
elections, including primaries.194 In light of the proposed solu-
tions, Congress is the most authoritative actor in this context 
and could implement any of them as they relate to federal elec-
tions.195 However, empirically, congressional efforts to regulate 
primary dates to avoid front-loading have been unsuccessful in 
provoking national party action.196 Nonetheless, a congression-
al attempt to regulate primaries may at least galvanize parties 
to act themselves.197 The issue of absentee ballots in caucuses 
is already under consideration by both national parties,198 so 
congressional pressure might be effective. 
By contrast, state governments have the authority, but 
probably not the capacity, to uniformly reform caucuses. Al-
 
 190. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4. 
 191. Id. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
 192. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 16. 
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though state governments may regulate the time, place, and 
manner of federal elections, their authority is subject to Con-
gress.199 Additionally, the Supreme Court has stated, “States 
themselves have no constitutionally mandated role in the great 
task of the selection of Presidential and Vice-Presidential can-
didates.”200 In voting for federal officers, voters exercise a fed-
eral—not a state—right, although state constitutions may ex-
pand this right.201 Therefore, states may act, but only without 
congressional objection. It is also noteworthy that states do not 
have a colorable Tenth Amendment objection to the imposition 
of greater regulation by Congress.202 
State legislatures could probably institute most of the rec-
ommendations proposed by this Note. However, it is often in 
the self-interests of state legislators to appease local and state 
party leaders, as they are repeat players in the electoral system 
and party leaders are likely to prefer the inflated influence they 
have under a caucus system.203 Further, congressional action 
would be preferable for purposes of national uniformity.  
Caucus state political parties and party leaders are unlike-
ly to support caucus reform because they generally benefit by 
controlling nominations by caucus, especially in early states 
like Iowa that receive national media attention.204 For example, 
if Iowa surrendered its caucus, unless it secured an equally cov-
eted first-in-the-nation primary date, its uniqueness would 
likely fade, and so would the attention it gleans from candi-
dates and national parties. 
Finally, it seems natural that the national parties are the 
fitting entities to reform the system. However, the parties may 
not actually have the influence necessary to regulate state par-
ties.205 This depends on the magnitude of reform national par-
ties pursue. Until recent decades, national parties have gener-
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ally left delegate selection details to state parties.206 Therefore, 
it is unclear whether they could force procedural change on 
state parties. In the context of primary frontloading, some 
scholars argue that parties have demonstrably failed to control 
state party action.207 For instance, the Democratic National 
Committee established a time window for delegate selection, 
but when state parties violated it in 1984, the National Demo-
cratic Party relented.208 In 2008, a similar controversy 
emerged, with the Democratic National Committee threatening 
to block Michigan and Florida delegations from the national 
convention.209 The Party eventually seated the delegates.210 
Based on this history, it is unclear that national parties would 
be able to institute national compliance, even if they wanted to. 
  CONCLUSION   
Caucuses have survived in the “backwater” of the nomi-
nations process.211 Despite public calls to modernize the 
process, many caucus states still require participants to be 
physically present to vote. This constraint raises grave consti-
tutional concerns under the doctrines of First Amendment as-
sociational rights, Fourteenth Amendment equal protection, 
and the Twenty-Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of poll or oth-
er voting taxes. This Note suggests that litigants may be able 
to challenge successfully the attendance requirement on one of 
these constitutional grounds. Alternatively, Congress would be 
the best agent to institute uniform presidential nomination 
reform. National parties may be able to instigate reform but it 
is unclear whether they have the influence necessary to uproot 
the entrenched caucus tradition. However, this Note also pro-
poses that various actors may be able to strike a compromise 
through more subtle caucus reform like an absentee ballot op-
tion or Internet voting. 
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